A critical adaptive feature of future thinking involves the ability to generate alternative versions of possible future events. However, little is known about the nature of the processes that support this ability. Here we examined whether an episodic specificity induction -brief training in recollecting details of a recent experience that selectively impacts tasks that draw on episodic retrieval -(1) boosts alternative event generation and (2) changes one's initial perceptions of negative future events. In Experiment 1, an episodic specificity induction significantly increased the number of alternative positive outcomes that participants generated to a series of standardized negative events, compared with a control induction not focused on episodic specificity. We also observed larger decreases in the perceived plausibility and negativity of the original events in the specificity condition, where participants generated more alternative outcomes, relative to the control condition. In Experiment 2, we replicated and extended these findings using a series of personalized negative events. Our findings support the idea that episodic memory processes are involved in generating alternative outcomes to anticipated future events, and that boosting the number of alternative outcomes is related to subsequent changes in the perceived plausibility and valence of the original events, which may have implications for psychological well-being.
Introduction
In recent years, there has been a surge in research focusing on episodic simulation or the construction of a detailed representation of a hypothetical personal future experience (Schacter, Addis, & Buckner, 2008) , as well as other types of prospective, future-oriented thought (Seligman, Railton, Baumeister, & Sripada, 2013; Szpunar, Spreng, & Schacter, 2014) . According to the constructive episodic simulation hypothesis (Schacter & Addis, 2007) , having a constructive, flexible episodic memory system allows individuals to imagine or simulate future scenarios by drawing on one's past experiences. This hypothesis has since been supported by extensive research highlighting the striking cognitive and neural similarities between episodic memory and episodic future simulation. For example, populations with deficits in recalling past events face similar challenges when asked to imagine future experiences, and there are significant overlaps in both the phenomenological quality and neural regions recruited when recalling the past and simulating the future (for recent reviews, see Benoit & Schacter, 2015; Schacter et al., 2012; Szpunar, 2010) . Recent work has explored not only the mechanisms that support episodic future simulation, but also the functions that future thinking may serve (for review, see Schacter, Benoit, & Szpunar, 2017) . The current paper aims to examine both the episodic memory mechanisms underlying our ability to engage in a specific type of future thinking-generating alternative outcomes to future events-and adaptive ways in which simulating alternative future events subsequently impacts our original expectations and perceptions of the future.
David Ingvar (1979, p. 21 ) previously theorized about the adaptive functions of future thinking, stating, "On the basis of previous experiences, represented in memories, the brain-one's mind-is automatically busy with extrapolation of future events and, as it appears, constructing alternative hypothetical behavior patterns in order to be ready for what may happen" (see also Schacter, 2012; Suddendorf & Corballis, 1997 , 2007 . Notably, the hypothesized preparatory function of future thinking has been demonstrated in the context of planning and problem solving (e.g., Arnold, Iaria, & Ekstrom, 2016; Gerlach, Spreng, Gilmore, & Schacter, 2011; Spreng, Stevens, Chamberlain, Gilmore, & Schacter, 2010) , prospective memory (e.g., Terrett et al., 2016 ), decision-making (e.g., Benoit, Gilbert, & Burgess, 2011 Peters & Büchel, 2010) , and emotion regulation (e.g., Taylor,
